This article re-examines the history of NATO's original post-Cold War enlargement to include the Visegrad states of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. It uses both published materials and the author's new interviews with key US and Russian policymakers, and employs robust qualitative counterfactual methods to ask two questions: whether there were any realistic alternatives to NATO enlargement, and whether NATO enlargement was responsible for the downturn in Russian relations with the West. It concludes that domestic politics were the dominant factors explaining policy directions on both the US and Russian sides; that NATO enlargement was probably inevitable given US domestic political factors and West European acquiescence; that Russia's turn against the West preceded the NATO expansion discussion in the US; that the tenor of the Russian turn is explained by status concerns rather than military threat perceptions, and that it was aggravated most by Western unilateral airstrikes rather than NATO's geographical enlargement; and that the one policy initiative that might have realistically slowed NATO enlargement if it had been adopted differently, Partnership for Peace, did not affect those Russian status concerns and thus could not have redirected the relationship.
Introduction
The enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to include more than a dozen new members since 1991 remains a major irritant in Russia's relations with the West. Russian President Vladimir Putin first raised complaints about NATO enlargement in an angry 2007 speech that shocked the annual Munich Security Conference, 1 and later tied Russia's annexation of Crimea to concerns about further NATO expansion. 2 In September 2014 Russia announced it was amending its military doctrine in part because of NATO enlargement, 3 
and in October 2016
Putin called the deployment of NATO troops to Poland part of 'a root change in the sphere of strategic stability'.
NATO airstrikes, with or without UNSC approval, in out-of-area operations. Russians knew their nuclear deterrent prevented those airstrikes from ever being used against them, but saw them as a symbol of Russia's declining global influence. Russia mourned its lost status more than it feared a new security danger, and no realistic alternative to NATO's geographic enlargement would have restored Russia's status in the system, especially given the expansion of NATO's mandates and the growth of US unilateralism.
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In sum, domestic political factors on both sides, and the confluence of domestic political power balances with domestically generated ideas, are what explain outcomes best. US domestic politics made NATO's geographic expansion inevitable by late 1994 -while Russian domestic politics made any Russian partnership with the West untenable as long as the West insisted on leading the new international security order, with or without NATO's geographic enlargement.
In the words of leading Russian international relations analyst Dmitry Trenin, Russia 'cannot put up with the military dominance of the U.S. And this is the key difference of Russia from other countries.'
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The requirements of rigorous counterfactual analysis
The literature on qualitative methods of counterfactual analysis is small but growing, 15 and scholars addressing the issue have largely come to agreement about what 'good' counterfactual methodology involves. 16 They argue that almost any causal argument in the social sciences, especially one based on the logic of necessary conditions, contains an inherent counterfactual statement. If we claim that x caused y, then we must be able to imagine a world where x (NATO enlargement) did not exist, and therefore y (a fraught relationship between Russia and the West) did not happen.
The challenge is to develop counterfactual scenarios that are realistic, involving as little manipulation of history as possible. Imagined scenarios should be based on events that were likely to have occurred in the real world, and the most convincing counterfactuals arise when multiple realistic choices were truly available to (and considered by) powerful policymakers at the time that they made their decisions. Furthermore, deep structural processes cannot be wished away, and counterfactual alternatives are only plausible when different policy choices could reasonably have led to different long-term outcomes. 17 Otherwise decisions become small bits of noise in a powerful historical machine whose general direction was unalterable.
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Finding a tipping point -a well-defined event that caused history to move overwhelmingly in a particular direction, and where significant movement away from that historical momentum became unlikely -is crucial. Reasonable policy alternatives must be in play before that tipping point is reached for any alternative future to be realistically imagined. Philip E. Tetlock and Geoffrey Parker use the 'Polya Urn game' from probability theory to illustrate this. At the start of this exercise, a large urn is partially filled with a matched number of blue and red marbles. Each player removes a marble at random, and then replaces it with two marbles of that colour (symbolising a change in a random historical factor). At some point in the game one color becomes dominant, 'rapidly transforming the improbable into the inevitable '. 19 This is the tipping point.
At the same time, each opening move of the game, before the tipping point is reached, has a negligible effect on the outcome and is soon overcome by random chance, allowing any one subsequently changed factor to have a potentially huge impact on the outcome. (The idea that random interactions can have an unexpectedly large impact on final outcomes is a basic tenet of chaos theory, as well, which explains, for example, why the exact path of major weather systems always remains unpredictable until the last minute.) This has an additional implication: the more counterfactual items an analyst introduces into the story, the more increases in random variation are also introduced, and the less plausible any alternative outcome becomes. 20 We might enjoy imagining alternative worlds that bear no resemblance to our own, but that kind of counterfactual analysis cannot help us understand real-world causal processes. In addition, the strongest counterfactual scenarios reflect generalisable principles that lead to other observable predictions. Unless the counterfactual is grounded in clear causal theory, the number of potential alternative outcomes is infinite, since if scenarios are left to the creative license of the analyst, anything becomes possible.
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In the sections that follow, I will first summarise the real-world history of US and NATO decisionmaking on NATO enlargement. The initial push came not from the US and its allies, but instead from Central and East European (CEE) states who were desperate to get out of the Russian orbit. This means Russia had lost its regional status and influence before NATO began considering expansion. I will then focus on identifying the tipping point, the time at which the enlargement decision reached sufficient momentum that there was no going back, and any policy alternatives had lost realistic traction. The evidence shows that this occurred in late summer and autumn of 1994, much earlier than many players recognised at the time. 41 Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 20. 42 Talbott, Russia Hand, p. 95. 43 Michael R. Gordon, 'U.S. opposes move to rapidly expand NATO membership', New York Times (2 January 1994). 44 Goldgeier, Not Whether but When, p. 21. 45 borders became the dividing line for NATO going forward, and wanted the line drawn further east instead. 48 But Germany's foreign minister and national security adviser both made clear to their American counterparts that they did not support Rühe's position, and that Germany as a whole was not in favour of quick NATO expansion. 49 And a majority of officials inside Clinton's government opposed immediate or overly quick enlargement (it is not clear in retrospect whether they opposed any enlargement ever, because they quickly fell into line behind Clinton's policy). On the one hand, disagreement within the Clinton administration (as well as in its key German ally) might have been a pathway to alternative policy choices being considered. But as we will see below, what mattered for the outcome was not the number of voices opposed to at least immediate NATO enlargement. It was instead the political savvy and manoeuvring of powerful individuals inside the White House who favoured enlargement intensely. Lake in particular was known for his 'bureaucratic gamesmanship', someone who 'alone [saw] Clinton on a daily basis', whose foreign policy views were rarely 'reversed or changed or modified', and who took advantage of 'the colorless qualities of his would-be rivals' at State and Defense. 50 A different outcome would have required a different set of players, violating the few-changes-as-possible rule of good counterfactuals.
Clinton's overall foreign policy direction in 1993 was being attacked as indecisive and un-strategic by Republican leaders in the House of Representatives. The idea of NATO's geographic expansion to reward movement toward liberal democracy fit with the administration's desire to show initiative on the international stage. Clinton asked Lake to hold a sort of 'sweepstakes' inside the NSC to come up with a foreign policy term to define the administration's strategic vision. In an explicit attempt to slow NATO enlargement (discussed in greater detail in one of the counterfactual scenarios below), the Pentagon developed the Partnership for Peace (PFP) initiative. The goal of PFP was to include both Russia and the CEE states in expanded military cooperation, including exchanges, joint training, and joint participation in peacekeeping operations with NATO, while the expansion of NATO's membership list was deferred. Its principal author was General Shalikashvili, and it was first proposed to NATO members at a defence ministers' meeting in Germany in October 1993. Perry thought it was particularly important to reach out to the Russian military through PFP because 'it was the institution that would endure, whatever might happen to … Yeltsin's democrats or their successors'.
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PFP became the focus of the January 1994 NAC summit. While Davis wanted to announce a set of criteria for future NATO membership and suggested offering 'associate membership' to the Visegrad states there, Strobe Talbott (Clinton's ambassador-at-large and special adviser to the Secretary of State on the newly independent post-Soviet states) had written a crucial internal memo in October 1993 that convinced Christopher to make PFP the centrepiece of the meeting instead. 55 By 1994 Europe was increasingly willing to follow whatever lead Clinton gave on the question. While France had proposed a WEU-alternative to NATO enlargement in 1993, already by the January 1994 NATO summit Paris decided it did not want to be the only NATO member standing in the way of enlargement. 72 Western Europe provided a permissive environment for whatever the Americans wanted to do.
In spring 1994 Lake had his staff prepare a NATO enlargement plan, presented to Clinton in June 1994 for approval. 73 On 1 July Clinton visited Warsaw and made his first clear public statement in favour of enlargement, calling PFP 'a first step toward expansion of NATO'. 74 He told the Polish Sejm on 7 July that Poland would likely be among the first invited to join. 75 Clinton promised Yeltsin that there would be 'no surprises, no rush, and no exclusion' as expansion went forward. 76 But on 1 December 1994, both Yeltsin and Kozyrev were surprised when the NAC foreign ministers announced their launching of an official NATO enlargement study to be completed by December 1995. Yeltsin reacted with fury, claiming that this marked a new 'Cold Peace' that replaced the Cold War, and believing that he had been tricked into complacency by the ambiguity of US policy statements.
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The tipping point of inevitability James Goldgeier argues that NATO expansion 'was by no means inevitable'. 78 Yet by the NAC meeting in December 1994, expansion had reached a tipping point of virtually inevitable forward momentum. This means that to be convincing, any counterfactual scenario must posit a different policy choice as being possible before that point. 
The history of the Russian reaction
It is extraordinarily difficult to characterise 'the Russian reaction' to the NATO expansion decision, because it was so varied. The 1990s in Russia were a decade of political and intellectual ferment, with Russian opinion leaders' views of Russian national identity split among many different possibilities ranging from pro-Western liberalism through realist statism, to ethnic nationalist revanchism. 84 In addition, the Russian government was unorganised and protean, leaving the US administration to operate in an environment where it lacked a clearly defined Russian counterpart for security decision-making with a well developed world view. 85 One of the elements that allowed NATO enlargement to remain politically attractive to the Clinton administration was the absence of a unified and determined Russian counter-thrust.
As both Talbott and Perry describe the situation, the Clinton administration was afraid that Yeltsin's government might fall at any time, and they were convinced that Kozyrev's days as Russian foreign minister were numbered. 86 There was no clear message coming from the Russian side about what it wanted. Some of the debate in Moscow was normal for any freewheeling democracy, with analysts expressing a wide variety of views in the press, and criticism by opposition parties in the parliament. 87 But there were two components of early 1990s Russia that were much more disturbing for the West. In December 1992, Kozyrev gave an infamous speech at the Stockholm CSCE summit where he pretended (without informing the audience for the first hour) to be an anti-Western nationalist; many in the audience thought at first that a coup had occurred in Russia. 90 By February 1993 -again before NATO expansion was being seriously considered inside the US administration or NATOYeltsin felt pressured by nationalists to take an illiberal spheres of influence stand in the Russian 'near abroad' states of the former Soviet Union, asking the UN to give Russia unique authority to lead peacekeeping missions in its own backyard.
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By spring 1993 the conflict in Russian politics had grown into a full-blown constitutional crisis. The second important fact about the Russian reaction is that the government did not speak with one voice. Russian foreign and security policy decision-making was disorganised, uncoordinated, subject to feuds within the Yeltsin administration, and unconnected to the broader political realities that Yeltsin faced in Russia. 100 The Foreign Ministry was so ill-prepared that it often had no set agenda for diplomatic meetings. 101 Yeltsin was impulsive, unpredictable, and often drunk (including in his first phone conversation with President Clinton after the latter's inauguration in January 1993).
Kozyrev says that the whole question of NATO expansion was 'never widely discussed' within the Russian government until after NATO's December 1994 announcement of the enlargement study. We understand … that a possible integration of East European countries with NATO will not automatically produce a situation where the Alliance would somehow turn against Russia.
We do not see NATO as a bloc opposing us. But it is important to take into account how our public opinion may react to such a step.
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In other words, Kozyrev's primary concern was domestic nationalists, not a NATO threat. Kozyrev once again said, this time to US Ambassador Thomas Pickering, that Russia had no objection to NATO expansion as long as Russia was the first to join. 125 Grachev chimed in that it 'would be unfortunate if the former Warsaw Pact states joined NATO in the near future, because this step would relegate Russia to a much more isolated position'.
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The counterfactual scenarios
While we might imagine a whole slew of possible alternatives to NATO enlargement, two primary possibilities have gotten the most attention in the literature and are worth discussing here. The first, the idea that Russia might have joined NATO or that NATO might have put itself under the oversight of an organisation where Russia had a strong voice (like the CSCE/OSCE), has been repeatedly and frequently raised by members of the Russian policy community. However, that was not a realistic possibility anytime from the early 1990s onward, given Russia's own political trajectory and its lack of consolidated liberal democratic reforms. The second, the idea that PFP could have delayed enlargement, was a real alternative being discussed in the White House in 1994 (and of course, PFP as a set of educational, training, and policy programmes continues to this day). However, its proponents lacked both the political savvy and the personal connections to boost it in time as an enlargement alternative -and it remains unclear that a delay of NATO enlargement would have had any effect on Russian status perceptions.
Counterfactual #1: Russia in NATO, or NATO under CSCE
This often intertwined set of counterfactual proposals arose frequently in Moscow: either that Russia could join NATO itself, or that NATO could put itself under the authority of the CSCE or the follow-on Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where Russia was a dominant player and could have influenced the direction of security decisions. The idea was repeated (half-heartedly) by Yeltsin several times during his years in office, and later by Putin as well.
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Indeed, Russian experts in the Working Group on Russia's Policy toward NATO (led by Karaganov as a member of Yeltsin's Presidential Advisory Council, and including a wide-ranging group of foreign policy analysts, government officials, and military officers) offered these two possible scenarios together in May 1995: either that Russia would join NATO, or that the security roles of the OSCE would be expanded into a 'UN regional arrangement' above NATO. In amazingly Soviet-style phrasing (and unanimity) for 1995, the group's stated goal was to work 'with main groups of the ruling classes in Western countries that consider the decision to enlarge too risky and/or too costly' to prevent NATO expansion. It should be noted, though, that this group did not worry that NATO enlargement posed a direct military threat to Russian territory, recognising that Moscow's nuclear deterrent prevented that. 129 They wrote, 'The North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a defensive military and political union of democratic states is not a military threat for a democratic Russia.'
Either the NATO-under-OSCE or Russia-in-NATO proposal would have given the unstable Russian government veto power over NATO's use of force, or at least a significant chance to obstruct it. When Primakov took office as the new Russian foreign minister in 1996, he hinted that Russia would support NATO expansion if it got 'restrictions on NATO and rights for Russia in a legally binding treaty'. 141 But barring long-term consolidation of a true liberal democracy in Russia, with firm civilian control over the military and ethnic nationalists relegated to obscurity, the US and NATO would never have given Russia that right. And as far as putting NATO under OSCE authority, the 1990s saw violent instability in several CSCE/OSCE members, including Yugoslavia (and its successor states) and the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova. NATO would never have left its decision-making subject to the whims of what would become OSCE's 57 participating states.
While former Secretary of State James A. Baker III did publicly broach the notion of Russia joining NATO in a December 1993 opinion piece, he was very clear that this proposal was conditional on Russia meeting membership criteria that it had not yet managed, including 'institutionalization of democratic practices and values … protection for minorities and acceptance of borders; adoption of free-market economics, and implementation of responsible security and proliferation policies'. 142 In 2002 Baker raised the option again, this time as a reward for Russian support in the US war on terror, but again emphasised its conditionality on Russian domestic political, human rights, and economic reforms. 143 In fact the option of Russia joining NATO has always been on the table, and remains there still -no US or NATO leader has ever said that Russia could not apply to join NATO. But during the period in question no Western leader believed Russia was close to meeting the criteria that defined an alliance which (in Baker's words) was fundamentally designed 'to promote one specific set of values', that of liberal democracy.
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Counterfactual #2: the Partnership for Peace delaying scenario
The most plausible alternative scenario -and a policy choice that was actually part of the Clinton administration's deliberations -was the notion that PFP could have truly become a temporary alternative to NATO enlargement, significantly delaying the expansion decision. This is what Perry himself preferred. 145 He and his Pentagon colleagues hoped this would allow 'Russia and other eastern European nations … more opportunity to work with NATO', and that 'by working on real operations with NATO, they would come to see NATO not as an enemy, but as a partner'. But to have turned PFP into a Clinton administration decision to delay NATO enlargement, Pentagon officials would have needed to be much more politically savvy. They would have had to build a coalition that cut Lake and Holbrooke off at the pass, before Clinton's close friend Talbott definitively turned to the pro-enlargement side. It is difficult to imagine that the self-described 'soft-spoken' and 'apolitical' Perry, 154 and the famously 'tightly wound' Clark 155 -neither of whom were particularly close to Clinton -could have pulled this off. Indeed Defense Secretary Perry seemed confused, calling a meeting on 21 December 1994 where he believed he could still convince other administration officials to adopt PFP as an alternative to enlargement. It was not until that meeting failed to achieve his goal that he fell into line behind creating a 'positive momentum' for enlargement. 156 To this day he believes that his failure to convince people at the December meeting -not his failure to parry Holbrooke's advance before the September showdown -was what doomed the expansion delay effort.
Nonetheless, since the PFP initiative is a policy contingency that was actually under consideration by the White House, it is a reasonable counterfactual to consider. If it had delayed expansion, anti-expansion activists in the United States would have had more time to garner support for their cause as well. Could permanent non-expansion have resulted?
The CEE countries would certainly have been furious, and would have continued their all-out lobbying effort in the US. From 1992 on, Poland made NATO 'the centerpiece of their domestic and foreign policy agenda', 158 even when popular dissatisfaction with economic reforms brought former communists into elected office. Poland's strategy was to try to 'embarrass' Washington into giving in -constantly asking for membership, prioritising costly economic and political reforms that moved it toward Western norms, participating in every possible PFP activity (even though Warsaw disliked PFP), and shifting its strategy away from talking about a potential Russian threat, toward citing its achievements and Article 10 of the NATO charter that said invitations might be issued to new members who could 'contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area'. 159 Polish diplomats worked together with the Polish American Congress lobbying group, and even tried to block Stephen Sestanovich's appointment as ambassador-at-large and special adviser to the secretary of state for the new independent states in 1997 because he had earlier criticised NATO expansion. 160 The combination of Republican dominance of the Congress with the effective Polish lobbying effort meant that the political pressure in Washington driving NATO expansion forward was immense. Robert Dole, then the presumptive Republican presidential candidate for the 1996 elections, had already begun attacking Clinton for not moving quickly enough on expansion. 161 The US defence industry also supported enlargement, and in 1996 Bruce Jackson, the Director of Strategic Planning at Lockheed Martin (the world's largest arms manufacturer at the time), co-founded a bipartisan lobbying group, the US Committee to Expand NATO, which among other things invited two dozen powerful senators to hear Secretary of State Madeleine Albright speak over dinner about the importance of NATO enlargement. 162 Clinton was a savvy political actor who believed in the utility of compromise with opponents. It is unlikely that Clinton, with strong NATO advocates inside his administration and strong lobbyists outside, would have allowed the Republicans to get the better of him by ceding the enlargement initiative to them indefinitely. Crucially for our story, though, both Kozyrev and Churkin said that when the Russian Foreign Ministry discussed NATO airstrikes and the later NATO-led peace operations in Bosnia, it was never tied to questions about NATO territorial enlargement. The issues fell into separate policy channels in Moscow. 174 If disenchantment with NATO was growing in 1993 and 1994, it was not (yet) because of geographical expansion plans.
Following a mortar attack on an open-air market in Sarajevo and a Serbian militia attack on a UN-mandated safe area in the city of Gorazde, UN Secretary Generay Boutros Boutros-Ghali and UNPROFOR asked NATO to begin 'pinprick' airstrikes in early 1994. Russia officially objected, claiming that the UNSC resolution had been misinterpreted, threatening to veto any further resolutions, and refusing UNPROFOR orders to move a Russian battalion. 175 While the immediate crisis was resolved, Russian feathers remained ruffled. The airstrikes grew in volume and intensity over the next year. Perry called Grachev after each strike to justify it, but did not share the plans beforehand with him out of fear that the information would leak to the Serbs. Grachev objected that Perry was 'only informing him, not consulting him'. 176 As a result, Grachev declared that Russia would have nothing to do with PFP as long as NATO was bombing Serb positions. 177 Meanwhile
Kozyrev began what the US side called a 'Lucy-and-the-football act', repeatedly agreeing to sign a document that would authorise specific Russian PFP activities, and then refusing to do so at the last minute. 178 By this time the Bosnia issue and the NATO enlargement issue had become intertwined temporally, so it is impossible to disentangle which was most responsible for Moscow's immediate PFP obstreperousness in late 1994. 179 Russia did eventually send 2,000 troops to participate in the NATO-led IFOR and SFOR peace enforcement operations in Bosnia starting in 1996, and there was significant cooperation on the ground. But joint military operations in Bosnia did not run smoothly, especially because Moscow surprised American officers by sending in a hardline officer, General Nikolai Staskov, to lead Russian forces even though he was outside the chain of command that had been negotiated. 180 Interoperability never gelled above the tactical level. 181 And while PFP did eventually include Russian participation, there was no unity inside the senior Russian officer corps about military-to-military exchanges as the 1990s wore on, with 'some leaders of the General Staff trying to derail them even as generals at the top of the Defense Ministry insisted on upholding them' for the sake of maintaining some form of Russian influence in Western security affairs. 182 As the 1990s proceeded NATO members conducted more and more out-of-area airstrikes, now without Russian consent. Russia was not consulted when the US and UK created no-fly zones with frequent airstrikes in Iraq. The most significant blow came in 1999, when NATO airstrikes against Serbia over the war in Kosovo, launched without UNSC approval, virtually sealed the end of real security cooperation with Russia in Europe. 183 Even though Russian forces would also participate in the NATO-led KFOR peace operations at the close of that war, their lack of coordination came close to causing a violent standoff with NATO forces under General Clark's command at the airport in Pristina. 184 And of course this was followed in 2003 by the US-led invasion of Iraq without UNSC support; that year Moscow pulled out of both SFOR and KFOR, 'thereby losing the opportunity for ground-level, day-to-day cooperation with NATO'. 185 In the end, there may simply have been too many conflicts of interest between NATO (and the US in particular) and the Russian military organisation to make PFP truly work the way that Perry had envisioned it (even though it continues on the books to this day, and other European states remain strong supporters of the effort). Even without NATO's geographic expansion, PFP could not have overcome the sense that NATO's role in global security affairs was growing at the expense of Russia's statist and nationalist definition of its own security interests. 
Conclusions
What does this exercise in counterfactual analysis allow us to conclude?
First, troubles between Russia and the West were not primarily caused by NATO's geographical enlargement. The nationalist Russian backlash began in 1990 and resulted in constitutional crisis, civil violence, and the use of military force in Moscow in October 1993, which was at least partly directed against the Kremlin's pro-Western liberal foreign policy. Pitched, entrenched resentment against the West and Russia's declining place in the world -not only by ultranationalists, but also by more moderate statists who were dismayed by Russia's decline in relative power -was established years before enlargement was being seriously considered by the United States or its allies.
Second, while NATO territorial expansion was an incredible irritant to Russia, no significant player in Russia believed it posed a direct military threat. Most experts did not view NATO's geographic enlargement in realist, geostrategic terms. 187 Instead the sense of threat came from themes more familiar to constructivists and social identity theorists, 188 who focus on questions of status and its decline and a resulting sense of humiliation, stigmatisation, and outsider standing by state populations. NATO's expanding role in the Balkans and both NATO and US use of airstrikes without Russian consultation and approval probably mattered more than NATO's geographic expansion in status considerations. Russia wanted to remain a great power whose interests would be taken seriously by the West (and especially by the United States, its key competitor), but the West could afford to disrespect Russia.
Third, just as domestic politics mattered most in explaining Russia's reactions to the West, US domestic politics also mattered most in explaining the decision to enlarge NATO. The only plausible US alternative to NATO enlargement in 1994, the Pentagon's Partnership for Peace policy, lacked the internal political traction to slow down the enlargement train inside the Clinton administration. PFP was a real policy alternative, nonetheless, that should be taken seriously as a counterfactual possibility. 
